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THREATS TO SECURITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A TRANSITION 
ECONOMY: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Abstract 
Effective property rights protection plays a fundamental role in promoting economic 
performance. Yet measurement problems make the relationship between property rights and 
entrepreneurship an ambiguous issue. As an advancement on previous research in this paper 
we propose a new approach to the evaluation of the security of property rights based on direct 
measures that overcomes some limitations of previous studies. We apply this new metrics to 
a survey of manufacturing firms in Russia to identifying the economic effects associated with 
the lack of property protection in a transition economy. Our analysis supports the view that 
there is a close relationship between institutions, property rights and economic growth. Our 
findings confirm that redistributive risks provide a depressing effect on investment and 
innovative activity of manufacturing enterprises and potentially result in a huge loss in 
efficiency and economic growth, which in other institutional settings could have been 
avoided. 
Keywords: property rights; economic institutions; economic growth 
JEL codes: O43, P14, P26, P27 
1. Introduction 
The insecurity of property rights is widely recognised as one of the most fundamental 
obstacles to successful economic development (Besley and Ghatak, 2009). Inadequate 
protection of property rights encourages firm owners to increase spending on sheltering 
“their” assets and the seizure of assets held by “others” as a form of rent seeking. As a result 
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resources become diverted from productive to non-productive purposes with negative 
consequences for investments and economic growth.  
 
In transition economies the status of property rights acquires particular poignancy because of 
what Frye (2006) calls “the original sin of privatisation”. It has been noted that even in 
countries with a long and uninterrupted tradition of democracy the privatization of once 
public assets creates unique legitimisation requirements because it is usually accompanied by 
the provision of some concessions and privileges to the new owners at a cost to the public 
that require justification (Moran, 2001). In transition economies on many occasions the 
leaders of privatization sacrificed the need to prepare a socially acceptable privatization to 
achieving the maximum speed and breadth of the destruction of state property (Kornai, 
2000). This was done in anticipation that once control was in the hands of private owners, 
they will support political reforms, creating strong legal property rights (rule of law). In quite 
a few cases, however, reality proved to be quite different as corruption and ineffective formal 
institutions “made private ownership close to irrelevant” (Freeland, 2000, p. 344). According 
to EBRD/World Bank 1999 business environment and enterprise performance survey 
systematic insecurity of property rights was a feature in 22 transition economies, including 
Russia (BEEPS, 1999). In fact, Russia is a prime example of a country in which lack of 
experience of a market economy, a murky privatization, abundant natural resources and low 
quality of institutional environment resulted in poorly-defined and poorly-enforced property 
rights (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2002). 
 
The rich literature on the security of property rights has one acknowledged weakness: there is 
no single universally accepted set of measurements that allow to establish the degree of 
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protection (Frye, 2006). The measurement problem makes the relationship between property 
rights and entrepreneurship an ambiguous issue because researchers often operate with 
indicators that cannot be directly compared. It does not help that property rights scholars 
normally employ a variety of indirect indicators to measure the security of property rights.  
 
In this paper we propose a new approach to measuring the security (strength) of property 
rights on a micro level and to identifying the effects associated with lack of their protection in 
a transition economy, using Russia as an example. The key conceptual advance is to focus on 
the threat of seizure of control of the firm by state or corporate agents rather than on 
“weaker” threats to property rights such as contract violations and regulatory predation. In 
our analysis we attempt to overcome some limitations of previous studies. First, in contrast to 
previous estimates commonly derived from such inferential characteristics of the institutional 
environment as the level of corruption or trust in courts, our estimates are constructed on the 
basis of direct data about potential redistributive threats as they are perceived by individual 
firms. Second, this study examines how the perception of different types of asset seizures 
influences the long-term choices of the firm. The paper is mainly an empirical one and 
provides some novel individual level data on an important topic.  
 
The results that we obtain confirm that risks of asset seizure are a factor that may seriously 
undermine investment and innovative activity with negative implications for efficiency and 
economic growth, which could have been avoided if property rights had been better 
protected. This result suggests that an increase in the security of property rights remains an 
important resource that can substantially improve the perspectives of economic growth in 
countries in which property rights do not receive adequate support from the institutional 
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setup. In the paper Russia serves as an example of a country in which this problem is explicit. 
However, the problem of security of property rights and its effect of firm’s behaviour is a 
general one, making the implications of this study relevant for other economies, transition 
and developing countries in particular. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a conceptual background to 
our analysis. Section 3 presents our data and provides their descriptive analysis. Sections 4 
and 5 identify major determinants of the threats to ownership in Russian manufacturing and 
evaluate impact of these threats on firm performance, using various econometric techniques. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual Background and the Design of Empirical Analysis 
Redistribution of property rights is an important and valid process that is essential for 
achieving market efficiency through concentration of capital in the hands of the most 
effective users. However, such redistribution requires the support of legal and regulatory 
institutions that hinder arbitrary changes in ownership following individual private or public 
decisions thus maintaining a level of security of property rights (Olson, 1996). Institutional 
failures may debase property rights and create a situation in which firm owners are more 
likely to pursue policies that prioritise short-term benefits over long-term returns; incentives 
to invest and innovate become reduced (Mauro, 1995); the structure of investments is 
distorted (Clarke, 2001) and assets seek safe rather than efficient applications (Dincer, 2007). 
 
6 
 
These predictions have dramatically materialised in a Russia. The importance of investigation 
of property rights in the country has been emphasised by theoretical insights that draw a link 
between extreme inequality in the allocation of wealth, a feature of many transition 
economies, and the imposition of the rule of law (Shleifer, 1997). This has given an impetus 
for a number of theoretical studies that show how lack of secure property rights can “lock up” 
an economy in a “bad” equilibrium when a system with insecure property rights serves well 
the economic elite and remains deficient for the others (Polishchuk and Savvateev, 2004; 
Sonin, 2003). When the most powerful and influential owners have sufficient resources to 
successfully defend their assets without recourse to a public mechanism of property 
protection by establishing and using private mechanisms of enforcement, they have no 
interest in the transition to a “good” equilibrium based on effective public mechanisms. As a 
result, the formation of efficient institutions is blocked because they do not find sufficient 
demand. Worse, the economy trapped in a “bad” equilibrium with fuzzy property rights may 
fall into a vicious circle, going through repeated cycles of coercive asset redistribution with 
low growth, high inequality, and wide-spread rent-seeking.  
 
Although protection of property rights has always been one of the main sore points of the 
Russian economy, empirical studies devoted to this issue are mostly limited either to a 
description of the various technologies of assets seizure (Radygin, 2009), or to a discussion of 
some “resonant” cases (such as the Yukos affair). Only few studies are based on 
representative micro-data or try to assess relationship between variation in the security of 
property rights for particular businesses and their performance (Hartarska, 2001; Hellman et 
al, 2000; Frye, 2002; Johnson et al, 2002; Pyle, 2007). There has been also a quantitative 
analysis that examines how different asset seizures have influenced the share price of firms 
(Goriaev and Sonin, 2005) and an examination of the types of firms especially likely to be 
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targeted by state takeover (Chernykh, 2009). In any case, chronologically the available 
studies address the period of the late 1990s - early 2000s and do not reflect more recent 
developments. 
 
2.1. “Market” and “non-market” channels of ownership redistribution 
Methodologically our approach differs from previous analysis in several respects. We start 
with introducing the conjecture that reallocation of property right can be brought about 
through “market” and “non-market” devices. The mechanisms of market selection fall in the 
first category. The second embraces coercive predatory mechanisms, such as the threat of 
expropriation by the state, pressure coming from politically influential private agents, raider 
attacks supported with various forms of violence, etc. Threats of the latter kind are more 
likely to occur if the institutional enforcement (rule of law) is weak and open to abuse by 
political and economic agents (Roland and Verdie, 2003). This distinction suggests that 
changes in existing ownership structures would be detrimental for economic efficiency when 
they are provoked by “non-market” predatory mechanisms, but would promote economic 
efficiency if they are caused by the forces of market competition.  
 
In practice a border-line between “market” and “non-market” channels of ownership 
redistribution is not clear-cut. The same action can be attributed to either category depending 
on the characteristics of the institutional environment in which it takes place. Hostile 
takeovers make a good example. They are a feature of any market economy. Although often 
controversial, they are widely regarded by theorists as an important element of an efficient 
market for corporate control that provides a mechanism both for raising shareholder value 
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and for enhancing the efficiency of the corporate system as a whole (Easterbrook and Fischel, 
1991). In Russia, however, hostile takeovers are driven by the raider’s private benefits of 
control rather than by efficiency improvement considerations (Lazareva et al, 2007). They 
exist as a means of appropriation of property using a variety of coercive methods ranging 
from corruptly obtained legal documents, such as shareholders’ resolutions, court judgments 
and state registration documents to physical violence (Firestone, 2008, 2010; Osipian, 2010). 
Historically this situation is rooted in shady privatisation that created conditions for 
continuous struggle for the redistribution of wealth between the rival groups of powerful 
nouveau riches. In 2000–2005 there were 6,900 hostile takeovers in Russia, 1,200 per year 
(Dzarasov, 2011); by comparison in the US in the last twenty years the annual average has 
never exceeded 19. Methods used by Russian corporate raiders exploit the failures of the 
existing institutions and bear substantial social cost. According to Lazareva et al (2007), this 
cost includes resources spent on offensive and defensive action comparable in size to the 
value of contested assets; costs associated with the interruption in the normal business 
operation and stripping the firm of its assets; weakening of incentives to invest; a tendency by 
major owners to accumulate an overwhelming portfolio of shares in their firms, a practice 
that results in low liquidity of firms’ stock.  
 
It is important to note that in Russia take-overs by private agents often do not represent 
“ordinary market transaction” (Chernykh, 2009). In fact, in Russia the term “hostile 
takeovers” has acquired an overtone that is not present in its usage in the developed countries 
and is mostly applied to captures assisted with various illegal and quasi-legal devices 
(Zhuravskaya, 2008). Also hostile takeovers are not carried out on behalf of shareholders 
against the will of incumbent managers because in Russia there is no separation of ownership 
and control as large owners either act as managers or actively supervise their companies 
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(Kuznetsov et al, 2008). As a result the managers-shareholders conflict, as in the US, is 
virtually nonexistent and therefore a hostile takeover essentially signifies absorption against 
the wishes of dominant shareholders.  
 
Attempts of re-nationalization can also interfere with market forces. In Russia it has been a 
feature of the last decade that the federal government and the government-controlled 
companies have gradually acquired majority and blocking minority stakes in a number of 
large companies. In 2006 alone the OECD documented as many as 29 major state 
acquisitions of private assets in a spectacular range of industries, including oil and gas, 
banking, electric power, nuclear construction, media, auto-making, machine-building, 
aviation, and titanium production (Chernykh, 2009). Usually, private assets are transferred to 
the partial or complete control of state companies that are commercial structures through the 
acquisition of a block of shares in a secretive deal the details of which are seldom disclosed. 
Considering that the owner of assets has little choice but to sell this transaction may be seen 
as a form of “non-market” take-over. 
 
Analysis of “market” and “non-market” means of property redistribution must take into 
consideration that the focus of redistributive processes may shift with time following changes 
in the institutional environment. Prior to the early 2000s, for example, Russian firms were 
mostly deprived of access to debt as a source of financing (Shleifer and Treisman, 2001). 
Despite this bankruptcy proceedings were quite common, but not so much as a form of 
protections for debtors as an instrument of hostile takeovers by corporate raiders assisted by 
corrupt administrators and by corrupt courts (Stubbs, 2009). As was estimated by the Russian 
Federal Service for Financial Markets, by the time the 2002 Insolvency Law was enacted 
10 
 
every fifth bankruptcy had the indicia of premeditated criminal actions as creditors forced the 
financially solvent debtors into bankruptcy in order to take control of the company’s assets 
(Zhang, 2008). However, since then Russia’s insolvency regime has undergone noticeable 
changes, with a number of new laws or amendments taking effect in 2008 and 2009. Orderly 
bankruptcy procedures have become quite common. This allowed the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development to characterise the insolvency regime in the country in 2010 
as making great strides towards compliance with international best practice (EBRD, 2010). 
Moreover, considering the conditions of deep economic crisis that hit the country in 2008, it 
is appropriate to anticipate a growing proportion of bankruptcies that are results of genuine 
economic distress. These developments suggest that the threat of bankruptcy, which was very 
much a “non-market” risk that owners in Russia faced in the 1990s and the early 2000s, has 
acquired in the recent period features that transform it into a “market” one according to our 
criteria. 
 
2.2. Measuring the security of property rights 
We further make a distinction between “weak” forms of the insecurity of property rights, 
when owners are facing the threat of partial expropriation of income from their assets because 
of corruption, biased courts, arbitrary and unpredictable changes of regulations, etc., and 
“strong” forms associated with outright capture of assets and their transfer under control of 
others. The point is that most previous micro-level studies have dealt predominantly only 
with “weak” forms of ownership redistribution (Frye, 2004; Hellman and Kaufmann, 2002; 
Johnson et al, 2002; Pyle, 2007) whereas we focus on “strong” forms according to our 
terminology. 
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Finally, to measure the degree of the security of property rights we introduce new non-
conventional metrics. Literature admits that there are no “objective” indicators, which would 
allow to make such measurements with sufficient accuracy, although it is understood that 
such indicators should reflect both the risk of expropriation and security of contracts (Aidis et 
al, 2009). Most often researchers use various proxies based on general characteristics of the 
politico-economic environment. Thus, papers dealing with the Russian context have 
employed such proxies as confidence in Russian President’s personal commitment to market 
reforms (Frye, 2004); the degree of democracy of political regimes in various Russian regions 
(Pyle, 2007); membership of surveyed firms in business associations (Frye, 2004; Pyle, 
2007). 
 
Since Knack and Keefer (1995) it is also common to measure the security of property rights 
with reference to the effectiveness of the judicial system. Indicators include such 
characteristics as freedom from government influence over judicial system; corruption within 
the judiciary; delays in receiving judicial decisions and/or enforcement; how much trust 
company have in the courts and whether they consider them fair and effective (Aidis et al, 
2009; Frye, 2004; Hellman and Kaufmann, 2002; Johnson et al, 2002). This approach 
assumes that owners who perceive the formal protection of their property rights to be 
inadequate are more likely to doubt the fairness and impartiality of court verdicts, as well as 
the ability of the judiciary to enforce their verdicts. Evidence of tax avoidance and 
involvement of firms in bribery are also used as a mark of dissatisfaction on their part with 
the formal legal protection of property rights (Asoni, 2008; Hellman and Kaufmann, 2002). 
Finally, some authors gauge demand for private protection for this purpose (Hendley et al, 
2000; Frye, 2002) or a combination of different measures (Johnson et al, 2002).  
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Indirect indicators, despite their high usability, have limitations. Being “circumstantial”, they 
measure not so much redistributive threats faced by the existing ownership structures per se 
as the effectiveness of possible defences against them that are available to various economic 
agents. A typical example is a widespread approach based on analysis of firms’ perceptions 
of the court system. For all its usefulness it only partially reflects a general level of insecurity 
since the courts are not the only and very often not even the most important tool available to 
owners protecting their rights. On the one hand, owners may choose to deal with certain 
violations of property rights outside the court system even if they regard it as effective and 
equitable. On the other hand, some owners can successfully defend their interests through 
non-judicial methods in the presence of the judiciary that does not enjoy their trust. 
 
In this study we attempt to complement previous research by employing direct measures of 
redistributive threats, expecting them to be more informative and accurate under certain 
circumstances. The measures we use are subjective probabilities of asset seizure as perceived 
by top managers who have immediate experience of the existing business conditions and are 
in a prime position to be able to estimate potential threats to existing ownership structures. In 
the empirical part of this research we seek to establish how these perceptions are associated 
with different objective characteristics of firms in Russia (e.g. size, location, form of 
ownership, industry, financial state, etc.), but even more importantly with local variations in 
institutional characteristics which traditionally were the focus of most previous studies such 
as the quality of the judicial system, the degree of corruption of civil servants, the level of 
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administrative pressure and so on.1 This serves as a starting point for an attempt to assess the 
impact of both newly introduced and more conventional measures of the security of property 
rights on firms’ long-term investment and innovation activities2.  
 
2.3. Problem conceptualization 
Although currently there is no developed theory of nationalization and other forms of “non-
market” ownership redistribution, from a conceptual point of view it may be argued that 
under different circumstances the same factor, e.g. the firm’s performance, may have very 
different effect on the security of property rights (Chernykh, 2009). Thus, strongly 
performing firms are an appealing target for nationalisation if the state seeks to boost its 
revenues. However, the state concerned with economic growth may choose to take over 
underperforming companies in order to restructure and modernise them.  
 
We agree with the general conclusion that many of the characteristics of firms can have an 
ambiguous effect on the risks of seizure of assets, but believe that this argument should be 
put into a broader theoretical perspective. Based on the standard logic of economic analysis, 
the impact of various structural and performance-related characteristics on firm-specific risks 
of assets seizure can be best described in terms of the likely benefits and costs that may result 
from such seizure. In many cases these characteristics are able to cause both the benefits and 
                                                          
1 Thus, for example, Frye (2003) has documented conspicuous variations in the degree of 
confidence that business people had in the judicial system in different regions of Russia. 
2 In this respect our approach is closest to the that by Chernykh (2009) who also analyzes the 
influence of various characteristics of enterprises on the risk of property redistribution. There 
are many differences however. Chernyck looks at realized events, a sample of Russian blue 
chip firms and at only one non-market risk, absorption by the state. Her analysis does not 
encompass the impact of the characteristics of the institutional environment on the risk of 
assets loss. We focus on anticipated events, rank-and-file Russian firms and consider a 
variety of market risks and institutional characteristics. 
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costs either to grow or to fall simultaneously. For example, we could expect that, in Russia, 
raiders should target larger firms with greater export potential because of their income 
generation ability. At the same time, to carry out the seizure of loss-making companies or 
companies with zero export potential would be much easier because of the lack of large 
financial resources and little political influence, through which they could try to protect 
themselves. The existence of this trade-off has an important implication: it makes it difficult 
to predict theoretically the net effect of assets seizure; the end impact of many variables may 
only be determined empirically.  
 
This situation is reflected in our models. They have variables of two types. The first include 
variables that may have predominantly a multidirectional influence on property risks. One 
example is the presence of the state among the shareholders. This may increase the risk of 
nationalisation or of establishing some form of control by local or regional authorities, but at 
the same time, the participation of the state may reduce the risk of raids by private agents 
unwilling to enter into conflict with the authorities. The second type includes variables that 
reflect the general state of the institutional environment. We hypothesise that they are likely 
to have far more unidirectional impact. These are, for example, the extent of corruption, the 
level of personal safety, the reliability of the judicial protection of property rights. If the first 
is high and the latter two are low, this creates the situation of instability that increases the cost 
of protecting the assets for individual owners. Of the same type is the involvement of firms in 
the “grey” or “shadow” economy, another common feature of the Russian business reality: it 
is likely to make the firm more vulnerable to potential attacks by both the state (in retaliation 
for tax evasion) and by private agents (as it reduces the opportunity for them to apply for 
legal protection in the courts and other official agencies). 
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Against this conceptual background our objective is to establish if the empirical data from 
Russia offers support to the two hypotheses central to the current discussion on property 
rights:  
H1: the poor quality of the institutional environment (high levels of corruption, lack of 
personal safety, the inefficiency of the judicial system, engagement in tax evasion, etc.) 
contributes to less secure property rights; 
H2: higher risks of property redistribution disincentivise businesses to take long-term 
economic decisions on such matters as investment, innovations, provision of supplier or 
customer credit, etc.  
 
3. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
We relied upon micro-data from the second round of the Russia Investment Climate Survey 
(ICS) of large and medium sized manufacturing firms carried out by the Higher School of 
Economics (HSE) in Moscow and the Levada-Center, a Moscow-based polling firm, for the 
Russian Ministry of Economic Development. With some amendments and modifications the 
questionnaire was based on the standard Business Environment Survey (now called 
Enterprise Surveys) that the World Bank had been conducting in many countries since 1998. 
The stratified random sample contained 957 firms across Russia and was representative of the 
population of Russian manufacturing enterprises. Selected firms were located in 48 regions 
and made five percent of all medium and large-sized manufacturing firms in the country. The 
sample does not include super-large industrial giants; the average number of employees for 
the participant firms is close to 600. The survey was conducted in early 2009, i.e., during the 
acute phase of the deep economic recession when most surveyed companies experienced a 
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sharp deterioration in economic performance. Data collection combined standardised face-to-
face interviews with top-managers (either CEOs or their deputies responsible for economic, 
financial and commercial issues) and objective economic and financial information about 
firms taken from their statistical reports and balance-sheets. 3  
 
Among others, the questionnaire contained a question about potential threats related to what 
we call “strong” forms of the insecurity of property rights, i.e., forms that lead to seizure of 
companies’ assets. Six possible sources of risk were mentioned in the question: incorporation 
into state-owned companies; take-overs by more powerful and politically more influential 
private companies; raider attacks; falling under control of local/regional authorities; 
bankruptcy; inter-corporate conflicts among major shareholders. Respondents were asked to 
assess the probability with which their firms could be hit by each of these eventualities on a 
3-point Likert-like scale (“very probable”, “more or less probable”, “very improbable”). 
  
In accordance with our understanding of developments on the Russian corporate scene one 
type of risks, bankruptcy, was classified as “market” and for this reason was excluded from 
the following analysis. It is appropriate to mention nonetheless that nearly 20 percent of 
respondents described the chances of bankruptcy as “very probable”, which is hardly 
surprising considering that the survey was held at the peak of a severe economic recession. 
 
                                                          
3 For a more detailed description of the sample see: Yasin et al, 2010. 
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For each specific risk we have about 850-860 observations, or about 90% of the total sample. 
The distribution of the surveyed firms by responses related to “non-market” redistributive 
threats is presented in Table 1. At first glance it would appear that the insecurity of property 
rights is not a major issue for Russian manufacturing firms as none of the identified risks was 
ranked as “very probable” by more than 14 percent of respondents. However, a different 
picture emerges if one looks at the total number of threats faced by surveyed firms as 
represented by the sum total of responses “very probable”. Table 2 (column 2) shows that 
more than 35 percent of the surveyed firms stated that for them at least one of the potential 
threats of asset seizure was “very probable”. In other words, more than a third of Russian 
manufacturing firms expressed belief that they were facing a high risk of losing their assets in 
one form or another. The situation looks even more dramatic if one considers the sum total of 
responses “very improbable”. Mere 20 percent of the surveyed firms regarded themselves as 
fully protected from any threats of asset seizure (Table 2, columns 4). Thus, complete 
confidence in non-alienability of ownership was expressed only by one in five companies. 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 also provides average number of anticipated threats (out of possible five) by 
probability per one firm. According to these figures, the average surveyed firm believed that 
it was confronted with a substantial number of very real threats (the number of “very 
probable” threats is 0.52 and of “more or less probable” is 2.2). These statistics paint the 
picture of a dangerous and aggressive business environment. 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 presents pairwise correlations (Spearman’s rho) between various redistributive 
threats. Coefficients range from 0.24 to 0.42 and are all significant at ρ0.01. This implies 
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that in most cases firms face not one type of redistributive threats, but a whole “bundle” of 
them: the emergence of one threat increases the likelihood of any other. 
Table 3 about here 
 
The HSE-Levada survey also gathered data on multiple structural, ownership and 
performance-related dimensions of participant firms (the summary statistics are presented in 
Appendix, Table A1). This set of characteristics is very rich. The most relevant for our 
purpose are data on firm size (number of employees); year of foundation; type of location; 
geographical position (we distinguish 8 major regions – six Federal districts plus Moscow 
and Saint-Petersburg); industry (8 sectors); the intensity of competition for major products 
produced by the firm (low/high); sales for export (yes/no); financial condition; subsidizing by 
the federal government (yes/no); subsidizing by local/regional governments (yes/no); 
shareholding by the state (yes/no); shareholdings by foreign investors (yes/no); shareholding 
by firm managers (yes/no).  
 
Even more important for our aims is that the data-set includes many characteristics that 
conventionally are used in the literature as proxies for the quality of the institutional 
environment. These are: quasi-voluntary participation in the provision of financial donations 
to social projects initiated by local/regional authorities; recent participation in litigations as 
plaintiff or defendant; confidence in the ability of the judiciary to protect contract and 
property rights of the firm in disputes with other firms; confidence in the ability of the 
judiciary to protect contract and property rights of the firm in disputes with the state; 
respondents’ estimate of whether firms in their industry are involved in the concealment of 
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sales or profits to evade tax payment4; corruption as an obstacle for doing business; threat to 
safety (theft, extortion, terrorism, racket, personal safety) as an obstacle for doing business. 
All these variables are constructed as dichotomous5 (for precise wording of the questions and 
construction of these variables see Table A2, Appendix).  
 
We start the examination of the relationship between firms characteristics and the likelihood 
of asset seizures with simple descriptive analysis. Table 4 reveals that in Russian 
manufacturing both individual redistributive risks and their average numbers per firm vary 
significantly by groups of firms with different structural, ownership, performance-related and 
institutional characteristics. It implies that in Russia the market and institutional environment 
continues to be very diverse and firms belonging to the same industry or region may confront 
different combinations of redistributive risks translating into a conspicuous variation in 
perceived threats. The most important observation from the raw data is that redistributive 
risks appear to be tightly and inversely linked to the quality of institutional environment.  
Table 4 about here 
 
4. Determinants of Redistributive Risks 
As a next step we attempt to identify in a multivariate setting major causes that might 
determine probabilities of asset seizure for Russian manufacturing firms with particular 
emphasis on the quality of the institutional environment on the assumption that weak 
institutions contribute to higher insecurity of property rights.  
                                                          
4 Following conventional practice we interpret recognition of concealment of sales or profits 
by other firms in the industry as indirect evidence of respondents' involvement in tax evasion. 
5 Some variables were recoded from initial ordinal to binary as it was found that the 
dichotomous format was more reliable because the gradation between Likert-scale answers 
was unnecessarily nuanced to be used as baseline specifications. 
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We start with estimating a series of probit regression models for various types of 
redistributive threats faced by Russian manufacturing firms in which dependent variables 
equal 1 if a given type of threat was reported as being “very probable” and 0 if otherwise. 
The vector of explanatory variables consists of characteristics of the institutional environment 
while controls include structural, ownership and performance-related characteristics of the 
firms described in the previous Section.  
Table 5 about here 
 
As it follows from Table 5 of all institutional proxies lack of personal safety statistically has 
the strongest impact on the security of property rights. It is positively and significantly 
associated with probabilities of inclusion into state-owned companies, take-overs by larger 
and more powerful private companies, raiders’ attacks and loss of assets by some 
shareholders as a result of inter-corporate conflicts. At the same time widespread corruption 
seems to activate only two types of redistributive risks – raiding and falling under control of 
local/regional authorities. This implies that in terms of protection of property rights the 
provision of personal safety and fight against crime might be more important than the 
containment of corruption. Engagement in tax evasion by means of concealment of the sales 
or profits positively correlates with all types of redistributive risks, though it reaches 
conventional levels of statistical significance only in the case of conflicts between major 
shareholders. Quasi-voluntary payments into social projects run by local or regional 
authorities are accompanied by higher probabilities of raiders’ attacks, falling under the 
control of local/regional authorities as well as of conflicts among major shareholders.  
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Particularly noteworthy are the effects related to the functioning of the judicial system. As it 
was already mentioned, in many previous studies perceptions of its fairness and effectiveness 
held by economic agents were used as proxies for the security of property rights. Our findings 
suggest that in terms of the “strong” forms of ownership redistribution associated with asset 
seizures the explanatory power of these measures may be modest. For instance, lack of the 
confidence of firms in the ability of courts to protect their contract and property rights in 
conflicts with other businesses often enters the estimated equations with a “wrong” (negative) 
sign. As Table 5 shows, the more pessimistically the surveyed firms assess their chances of 
success in litigation with other companies the lower is the likelihood that they could be 
included into state-owned companies or fall under control of local or regional authorities. 
However, if we turn to litigation with the state, correlation becomes positive, although 
statistically insignificant in most cases. Interestingly, recent litigation experience (both as 
plaintiffs and as defendants) intensifies at least one type of redistributive risks - the threat of 
inclusion into a state-owned company though the mechanism of this effect is not clear.  
 
As for structural and performance-related characteristics, the statistically strongest 
relationships are found for size: the larger the firm the greater is the risk for it to be included 
in a state-owned company, but the lower the risk to be subjected to raider attacks or to 
become an arena for a conflict among major shareholders. These results do not come as a 
surprise: it is large and super-large companies that most often attract attention of the state but 
at the same time their size sometimes serve as a shield against attacks by private agents. The 
proxy for firms’ age has little impact on redistributive risks of any type. Location provides 
strong impact on threats of raider attacks: firms located in rural areas face substantially 
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greater risk in comparison to their counterparts in urban areas. High competition increases 
considerably the likelihood of take-overs by larger private companies, but appears to remains 
neutral to other types of risks. Export orientation substantially strengthens the security of 
property rights: exporters are less likely not only to be included in state-owned companies or 
falling under control of local/regional authorities, but also to be captured by larger and more 
powerful companies (which is not intuitively obvious since such firms should be much more 
attractive targets for take-overs). Economic performance measured by firms' financial 
condition correlate significantly with only one type of redistributive risks – take-overs by 
larger and more powerful companies. It is remarkable that this threat is higher for 
underperforming rather than for better performing firms. Subsidizing from the local/regional 
budgets predictably increases the likelihood of falling under control of local/regional 
authorities while subsidizing from the federal budget does not make incorporation into state-
owned companies more probable. 
 
With regard to the ownership characteristics, state ownership dramatically enhances the 
threats of incorporation into state-owned companies as well as becoming a target for capture 
by larger private firms and falling under the control of local/regional authorities. Surprisingly, 
contrary to expectations, foreign ownership provides no visible effects on the redistributive 
risks. Managerial ownership has a strong positive correlation with the risks of firms’ 
incorporation into state-owned companies and of raider attacks.  
 
As a next step, we repeat our econometric exercises for models with two alternative integral 
indices of the insecurity of property rights as dependant variables: the additive index, which 
is constructed as the sum total of responses “very probable” to the question about the 
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probability of various redistributive risks6, and the binary one, which equals 1 if the response 
“very probable” was given by the firm at least once and 0 otherwise (Table 6). Vectors of 
explanatory variables and of controls are the same as in the models for specific redistributive 
risks discussed earlier.  
Table 6 about here 
 
It is worth noting that our additive index is a count variable that reflects the total number of 
redistributive threats. To ensure the robustness of the results to model specifications with this 
index we undertook analysis using two econometric techniques: OLS and a count data model. 
As there is overdispersion in the data, we used the negative binomial model in preference to a 
Poisson model (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986).7 For specification with the binary index we 
estimated a probit regression model. The results provided by these alternative approaches 
turned out to be highly consistent. We have chosen the model of negative binomial regression 
as our preferred specification. 
 
As can be seen from Table 6, in this specification results for controls are close to those 
obtained in regressions for the specific threats to property rights. The average number of 
redistributive risks is significantly larger for firms partially or fully owned by the state, in 
                                                          
6 A similar approach is used by Johnson and his co-authors who note that either of these 
indexes can be justified theoretically (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002: 1340). In the 
context of our analysis the additive index is more appropriate if reporting more than one 
“very probable” risk indicates a greater level of insecurity than reporting only one. The 
binary index is more appropriate if the presence of one contender aiming to seize company 
assets has the same effect as the presence of multiple contenders.  
7 In principal, we could analyze count data using multiple linear regression. But the 
preponderance of zeros and small values and a clearly discrete nature of the additive indicator 
suggested that we could improve on the linear model with Poisson or negative binomial 
specifications that account for these characteristics. 
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poor financial condition, not large-sized, faced high market competition and located in the 
countryside. At the same time other determinants such as age, foreign or managerial 
shareholdings, export orientation, subsidizing from the federal or local/regional budgets 
appear to be not significant.  
 
Among our institutional variables only one - confidence in the efficiency and impartiality of 
the courts in disputes with other enterprises - is statistically insignificant. The rest are 
strongly associated with the additive index of the insecurity of property rights. With other 
variables being equal to the sample averages, transition from high to low personal safety 
increases the average number of redistributive risks by 0.26; from a low level to a high level 
of corruption – by 0.11; from non-engagement to engagement in tax evasion – by 0.11; from 
absence to presence of recent litigation experience – by 0.12; from zero to active quasi-
voluntary “sponsorship” of social projects run by local and regional authorities – by 0.14; 
from high trust to low trust in the impartiality of the courts in disputes with the state – by 
0.09.  
 
On the basis of estimates obtained for our preferred model we performed simulations for a 
“favourable” institutional environment characterised by safe and incorrupt conditions, 
confidence in the capacity of judiciary to defend the interests of businesses in conflicts with 
state or other companies, absence of the necessity to take part in frequent court litigations, 
non-participation in tax evasion, freedom from forced financing of social projects run by 
regional or local authorities and an “unfavourable” institutional environment for which 
characteristics are the opposite to those described above. The simulated value of the additive 
index of the insecurity of property rights for firms in the “favourable” institutional setup is 
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0.14 whilst for firms in the “unfavourable” one it is 1.18. This implies that in the presence of 
well functioning institutions firms are almost completely protected from attempts of asset 
seizure while in their absence such attempts becomes practically an inevitability.  
 
For all models with the integral indices we provide robustness checks by varying explanatory 
or controlling variables. First, we replaced the dichotomous variable of financial condition 
with an alternative continuous measure of firms’ performance – profit margin. Second, 
instead of using court characteristics, corruption and personal safety variables in binominal 
form we re-defined them as ordinal ones (for more details on this alternative definition, see 
Table A2, Appendix). Third, because of concerns associated with possible interrelatedness 
between measures related to the court system we estimated a series of additional 
specifications in which these variables were included one at a time. We re-estimated our 
models with these alternative sets of regressors and results remained broadly similar to those 
in the baseline specifications. They differed only for judicial protection against the state: 
defined as ordinal variable or included as a sole court characteristic it ceased to be significant 
at least at the 0.10 level.  
 
The presence of multiple missing values for some variables in our data-set raises concern 
regarding possible selection-bias.8 To address this issue, first, we compared two sub-samples 
of firms, one without any missings and the other with some missings, in terms of their 
structural, ownership and other characteristics. The comparison did not reveal significant 
                                                          
8 For any of our regressors the share of observations with missing values does not exceed 10-
15 percent. However, cumulatively this reduces the number of observations suitable for 
analysis to 664, or about 70 percent of the total sample. Within this sub-sample merely 27 
respondents did not provide information on any redistributive risks while 55 provided it 
selectively on some of them.  
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differences between these groups (Table A3, Appendix). Next, as a more rigorous test we 
applied the maximum likelihood estimator of Heckman model. The LR test of independency 
of equations (rho=0) confirmed the absence of a substantial selection bias in our results 
(Table A4, Appendix).  
 
Another possible concern with our findings is the endogeneity problem. Although we use an 
extensive set of controls there is a possibility that the results are driven by some omitted 
variables. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that individuals with more pessimistic dispositions 
are more likely to report threats to their firm and at the same time be more critical of existing 
institutions. To address this eventuality, we estimated an additional specification with control 
for respondents’ personal characteristics (their place in managerial hierarchy (CEO/non-
CEO), tenure and some others). In this extended specification coefficients for all personal 
variables are insignificant while the results for institutional proxies remain virtually the same 
regarding both direction and size of the effects.9 
 
On the whole our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the poor quality of the 
institutional environment undermines the security of property rights. Ceteris paribus, 
redistributive risks tend to be higher for companies that operate in an unsafe and corrupt 
environment, actively engage in shady dealings, are forced to “sponsor” social projects run 
                                                          
9 As for the possibility of reverse causality, i.e., the situation in which perceived redistributive 
risks would affect the quality of institutions, we believe that this is plausible only in the case 
of very large companies with the market power great enough to influence their institutional 
environment. However, there were no such companies in the HSE-Levada survey. 
Nevertheless, as an additional robustness check, we re-estimated the model of negative 
binomial regression excluding 5 percent of firms with the largest number of employees. The 
estimations obtained for this censored sample are qualitatively similar to those for the 
uncensored one presented in Table 6. 
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by local or regional authorities and have to cope with an inefficient and unfair courts. At the 
same time our estimations show that to a large extent risks of asset seizure are idiosyncratic 
(i.e., context specific), and for this reason can only be partially captured by institutional 
proxies conventionally used in literature. This allows us to speculate that perceived threats to 
property rights may provide strong autonomous impact on firms' forward-looking decisions 
alongside and in addition to influences exerted by the characteristics of the general 
institutional environment.  
 
5. Impact of the Insecurity of Property Rights on Firms’ Economic Behaviour 
As was mentioned earlier, the central theme in the literature is the impact of the insecurity of 
property rights proxied by various characteristics of the institutional environment on the 
indicators of firms’ performance (mostly various measures of investment activity) (Frye, 
2004; Hartarska, 2001; Johnson et al, 2002; Pyle, 2007). Firms with poorly protected 
property rights are more likely to suffer from short-termism and as a result are less likely to 
be inclined to invest in large projects; to bring about innovations; to provide supplier or 
customer credit; to set and pursue strategic objectives.  
 
We test this association econometrically for Russian manufacturing firms. The HSE-Levada 
survey provides us with five different binary (in the format of “yes” or “no”) characteristics 
of forward-looking decisions made by firms: performing large investments in 200810; 
                                                          
10 Investment was defined as large if it was more than annual depreciation or exceeded 10% 
of the value of fixed assets. 
28 
 
implementing innovations recently; provision of customer credit11; planning investment 
projects for the next year; employing long-term strategic plans in the running of the company.  
 
We take these five dummies as dependant variables where they equal 1 if a firm is involved 
in a particular type of economic activity and 0 otherwise and estimate for them a series of 
probit regression models. The vector of controls is identical to that in Section 4. As 
explanatory variables we use both specific threats to the security of property rights and their 
integral indices in two alternative formats – additive and dichotomous. Multiplicity of 
specifications serves as a robustness check for results that we obtain. Additionally we include 
in these models general characteristics of institutional environment conventionally used in the 
empirical literature on this subject. 
 
We start with the examination of specifications that use specific redistributive threats as 
explanatory variables. Overall we estimated a series of 25 probit-regressions (5for each type 
of redistributive threats); however, for simplicity in Table 7 we display marginal effects only 
for variables, representing redistributive threats, and omit findings for other determinants. 
The results are mixed. Though for most individual threats coefficients have an expected 
negative sign, only a few of them are significant. The most important in terms of forward-
looking economic behavior seem to be inter-corporate conflicts between major shareholders 
while the least significant are raider attacks. The apprehension of inclusion into state-owned 
companies, of being absorbed by larger and more powerful companies or of falling under 
control of local or regional authorities also exerts visible depressive impact on firms’ 
forward-looking decisions. However, the firm may face simultaneously more than one 
                                                          
11 This measure was first proposed by Frye (2004). 
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redistributive risk. Consequently, even the risks that have been found to be insignificant on 
their own may contribute to the cumulative destabilizing effect that insecurity of property 
rights inflicts on its investment and innovative activity. 
 
To test this proposition we turn to models with the integral indices (both additive and binary) 
(Tables 8 and 9). The results from these specifications are well in line with each other. In all 
cases risk variables enter estimated equations with a “correct” (negative) sign and only in one 
case – provision of customer credit – do not reach standard levels of statistical significance 
(in specification with the additive index). This indicates that the stronger the risk of capture 
of assets in all its forms, the greater the likelihood that the company would avoid large 
investment projects, would not innovate, not lend to their customers, not have large 
investment projects and would not practice strategic planning.  
Tables 7 and 8 about here 
 
In specifications with the additive index (Table 8) the presence of one extra redistributive risk 
increases the probability that the firm did not implement large investment and did not carry 
out any innovations by 6 percentage points in each case. At the same time the probability that 
it had no investment projects for the next year increases by 5 percentage points and the 
probability that it does not practice strategic planning – by 6 points. In addition, it follows 
from the specification with the binary index that the presence of at least one “non-market” 
redistributive risk dramatically, by 11 percentage points, weakens the willingness of a firm to 
provide customer credit (Table 9). 
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It is logical to assume that the combined impact of multiple redistributive risks is likely to be 
even more depressive than the estimates of marginal effects indicate. To verify this 
supposition we used coefficients obtained in the models with the additive index and 
performed simulations for two polar groups of firms - “completely protected from 
redistributive threats” (additive index = 0) and “completely unprotected from redistributive 
threats” (additive index = 5). The simulations reveal that as a result of moving from the 
“completely protected” category to “completely unprotected” the firm is likely to see the 
probabilities of making large investment decreasing by 20 percentage points, of 
implementing innovations by 17, of having investment projects for the next year by 20 and of 
practicing of strategic planning by 18 percentage points. This is evidence that redistributive 
threats have profound influence on firms’ long-term growth and, as a consequence, are 
important factors of economic development. 
 
The estimation outcomes for institutional proxies are less straightforward. Regression 
coefficients for these variables are mostly insignificant and in many cases have “wrong” 
(positive) signs. These findings are robust to alternative specifications and observed in 
regressions with both additive and binary integral indices. Cases when we get statistically 
significant results with a “correct” (negative) sign are few and include the impact of low 
confidence in judicial protection in disputes with the state on innovations and strategic 
planning (in specifications with the additive index) and the impact of lack of personal safety 
on future investment (in specification with the binary index). The positive effects are more 
difficult to rationalise, although some are liable to a plausible interpretation. One example is 
the positive effect of tax evasion on future investments: this might be a reflection of a 
tendency to re-invest a part of revenues concealed from tax authorities which is quite usual 
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for many Russian firms.12 However, offering a rational interpretation of the alleged positive 
effect of perceived partiality/inefficiency of the judicial system on firms' propensity to 
provide customer credits does not look as a feasible task and appears to be spurious. As a 
general conclusion, our analysis suggests that idiosyncratic risks of asset seizures are better 
predictors of firms' investment and innovative performance than general characteristics of 
institutional environment – at least in the case of Russian manufacturing. Of course, the fact 
that these more conventional measures of the insecurity of property rights turned out 
insignificant may very well be just a feature of our sample, so it is not clear whether these 
results are generalizable.  
 
Next, we implemented robustness checks by varying explanatory variables. For this we 
performed two additional series of probit-regressions on firms’ investment and innovation 
characteristics with the same vector of controls. The first includes the additive index of 
redistributive threats but excludes institutional proxies. The second, on the contrary, includes 
institutional variables but excluding the additive index. In the first series results obtained for 
the risk indicators are almost identical to those in Tables 8 in terms of both the direction and 
the size of the effects. The only difference is that the effect of the additive index on 
probability for the firm to have investment projects, although staying negative, ceases to be 
statistically significant. In the second series the results are also not substantially different 
from those in Table 8 either. In most cases regression coefficients for institutional variables 
remain insignificant and frequently enter the estimated equations with a positive sign. The 
differences worth mentioning are that the effect on innovations of perceived inability of 
courts to provide judicial protection against the state ceases to be significant whilst the effect 
                                                          
12 Another plausible interpretation is that firms more prone to tax evasion have more effective 
and sophisticated accounting departments. A proverb very popular in Russian business in the 
90-s says: "If your firm’s accounts show profit it means that you have an inapt accountant". 
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on future investment of lack of personal safety becomes significant at 0.05 level. Overall, 
findings for both the risk variables and institutional proxies prove to be robust to changes in 
model specifications (the results are available on request). 
 
A possible problem with our findings is potential multicollinearity that could occur in the 
presence of high correlation between variables. However, for all estimated equations variance 
inflation factors stay in the narrow range of only 4.5-5.5 and thus are substantially below the 
levels that are considered to be critical in the econometrics literature (Kutner, 2004). This 
indicates that our estimates are not likely to be seriously affected by this problem.  
 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the possibility that our results might be biased due to 
endogeneity in the form of reverse causality when the firm’s investment and innovative 
activity determine the perception of redistributive threats held by its managers. Indeed, it is 
not illogical to assume that of two firms identical in terms of structural, ownership and 
performance-related characteristics the more investing and innovative one would be a more 
attractive target for potential assailant than less investing and less innovative one. Hence, if in 
the case of direct causality we can expect a negative association between threats of asset 
seizure and firm’s investment and innovative activity, in the case of reverse causality it 
should be positive. In fact, our estimations produce negative association thus implying that 
direct causality dominates over the reverse one. From this we can infer that, if the effects of 
endogeneity are abstracted away, the true impact of redistributive threats on firms’ 
investment and innovative activity would remain negative, but even larger by size than those 
presented in Tables 8 or 9. However, it must be acknowledged that our data are not panel and 
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there are no good instruments for our redistributive risks in it. Therefore, our findings are not 
sufficient to make strong causal claims and should be interpreted with caution.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Our study contributes to the literature by employing a new approach to measuring the 
security of property rights and the evaluation of their impact on firms’ performance. 
Although our analysis focuses on Russia, as far as the application of the new metrics is 
concerned, it is of general relevance. Our research broadly supports the existing view of a 
close relationship between institutions, property rights and economic growth, it suggests that 
the ability of some of the widely used measures of the insecurity of property rights to come to 
grips with the “strategic” risks of asset seizure is limited. This study has own limitations of 
course. The fact that our research is based on cross-section data restricts our ability to make 
strong causal claims. Another issue is that our measures reflect personal perceptions of the 
respondents. There is a debate in literature regarding the extent to which perceptions data, 
despite many advantages, adequately capture the relevant reality. A prevailing view seems to 
be, however, that any possible concerns cannot disqualify the use of such data (Kaufman et al 
2007, 2010).  
 
The measures introduced in this paper complement traditional measures. They help to 
operationalize the problem of the insecurity of property rights and enrich our understanding 
of this phenomenon. Our analysis shows that the risk indices that we have identified reflect 
profound behavioural traits and have a strong and significant impact on various indicators of 
investment and innovative activity. In this sense the new metrics that we have proposed in 
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this paper contributes to a more complete picture of the negative influence of the insecure 
property rights on firms’ long-term economic decisions. 
 
On the whole this study confirms that the Russian economy continues to operate on 
extremely shaky foundations as far as the status of property rights is concerned. Under such 
circumstances it is difficult to expect high levels of investment and innovation activity, 
because the owners see their chances to receive any benefit from long-term projects as 
extremely problematic. At the same time it must be remembered that our research is based on 
data collected during an acute phase of a deep economic recession when most surveyed 
companies experienced a sharp deterioration in economic performance. It is plausible that if 
the survey had been conducted in a different environment some of responses could have been 
less pessimistic. We tried to minimise the impact of economic conjuncture by introducing a 
distinction between “market” and “non-market” risks of property redistribution and excluding 
“the risk of bankruptcy” from our analysis. Overall, we believe that the survey has succeeded 
in revealing some fundamental attitudes that do not depend on the phase of the economic 
cycle. 
 
Our findings have general implications for other transition economies and developing 
economies. They confirm that redistributive risks provide a depressing effect on investment 
and innovative activity of manufacturing enterprises and potentially result in a huge loss in 
efficiency and economic growth, which in other institutional settings could have been 
avoided. This result suggests that an increase in the security of property rights remains an 
important resource that can substantially improve the perspectives of economic growth in 
these countries. 
35 
 
7. Acknowledgements 
8. References  
Aidis, Ruta, Estrin, Saul, Mickiewicz, Tomasz, 2009. Entrepreneurial entry: which 
institutions matter? Institute for the Study of Labour IZA Discussion Paper No. 4123, Bonn, 
Germany. 
Asoni, Andrea, 2008. Protection of property rights and growth as political equilibria. IFN 
Working Paper No. 737. 
Besley, Timothy, Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. Property rights and economic development. In 
Rodrick, Dani and Rosenzweig, Mark, (eds.) Handbook of development economics. Elsevier, 
pp. 4525-4595. 
BEEPS, 1999. Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, EBRD/World 
Bank. 
Chernykh, Lucy, 2009. Profit or Politics? Understanding Renationalizations in Russia. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562047 
Clarke, George R. G., 2001. How institutional quality and economic factors impact 
technological deepening in developing countries. Journal of International Development 13, 
1097–1118. 
Cameron, Colin A., Trivedi, Pravin K., 1986. Econometric models based on count data: 
comparisons and applications of some estimators and tests. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 
1, 29-53. 
Dincer, Oguzhan, 2007. The effects of property rights on economic performance. Applied 
Economics, 39, 825–837. 
36 
 
Dzarasov, Ruslan, 2011. Eichnerian megacorp and investment behaviour of Russian 
corporations. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 35, 199–217. 
Easterbrook, Frank H., Fischel, Daniel R., 1991. The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 370 pp. 
EBRD, 2010. EBRD Insolvency Law Assessment Project, 2009: Russian Federation. Country 
report. London, EBRD. 
Firestone, Thomas, 2008. Criminal corporate raiding in Russia. The International Lawyer, 42, 
1207-1229. 
Firestone, Thomas, 2010. Abuse of the law and complex crime in post-Soviet Russia. Denver 
Journal of International Law & Policy, 38, 555-580. 
Freeland, Chrystia, 2000. Sale of the Century: Russia’s Wild Ride from Communism to 
Capitalism. New York, Random House. 
Frye, Timothy, 2002. Private protection in Russia and Poland. American Journal of Political 
Science, 46, 572-584. 
Frye, Timothy, 2004. Credible commitment and property rights: evidence from Russia. 
American Political Science Review, 98, 453-466.  
Frye, Timothy, 2006. Original sin, good works and property rights in Russia. World Politics, 
58, 479-504. 
Goriaev, Alexei, Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. Is political risk company-specific? The market side 
of the Yukos affair. EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=676875 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.676875. 
37 
 
Hartarska, Valentina, 2001. Investments and Property Rights in Russia: Evidence from Small 
Firms in Russia. Paper presented at annual meeting of the American Agricultural Economics 
Association, Chicago, 2001.  
Hellman, Joel S., Jones, Geraint, Kaufmann, Daniel, 2000. “Seize the state, seize the day”: 
state capture, corruption, and influence in transition. Policy Research Working Paper Series 
2444, Washington, The World Bank. 
Hellman, Joel, Kaufmann, Daniel, 2002. The Inequality of Influence. Working paper of the 
World Bank Institute, Washington DC. Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/inequality_influence.p
df 
Hendley, Kathryn, Murrell, Peter, Ryterman, Randi, 2000. Law, relationships and private 
enforcement: transactional strategies of Russian enterprises. Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 627-
656. 
Hoff, Karla, Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2002.  After the big bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the 
rule of law in post-communist societies. National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 9282. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9282 
Johnson, Simon, McMillan, John, Woodruff, Christopher, 2002. Property rights and finance. 
American Economic Review, 92, 1335-56. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2007. Growth and governance: a 
reply/rejoinder. Journal of Politics. 69, 555-562. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2010. The worldwide governance 
indicators: methodology and analytical issues. World Bank, Washington DC. 
38 
 
Knack, Stephen, Keefer, Phillip, 1995. Institutions and economic performance: cross-country 
tests using alternative institutional measures. Economics and Politics, 7, 207–27. 
Kornai, János, 2000. Making the transition to private ownership. Finance & Development, 
37(3). Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/09/kornai.htm 
Kutner, Michael, Nachtsheim, Christopher, Neter, John, 2004. Applied Linear Regression 
Models, 4th edition, McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
Kuznetsov, Andrei, Kapelyushnikov, Rostislav, Dyomina, Natalya, 2008. Performance of 
closely held firms in Russia: evidence from firm-level data. The European Journal of 
Finance, 14, 337-358. 
Lazareva, Olga, Rachinsky, Andrei, Stepano, Sergey, 2007. A survey of corporate 
governance in Russia. Working Paper No 103, CEFIR / NES. 
Mauro, Paolo, 1995. Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, pp. 681-
712. 
Moran, Michael, 2001. The lost legitimacy: property, business power and the constitution. 
Public Administration, 79, 277-296. 
Olson, Mancur, 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation 
andEconomic Rigidities. New Haven, USA, and London, UK: Yale University Press. 
Olson, Mancur, 1996. Big bills left on the sidewalk: Why some nations are rich, and others 
are poor. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10: 3-24. 
Osipian, Ararat L., 2010. Corporate raiding Russian style: hostile takeovers via corruption 
and fraud. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science 
Association (APSA), Washington, DC, in September 2010. 
39 
 
Polishchuk Leonid, Savvateev, Alexei, 2004. Spontaneous (non)emergence of property 
rights. Economics of Transition, 12, 103–127. 
Pyle, William, 2007. Organized business, political regimes and property rights across the 
Russian Federation. BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 18, Helsinki, Finland.  
Radygin, A. 2009. Vnutrennie mekhanizmy korporativnogo upravlenia. Мoscow: Delo. 
Roland, Gérard, Verdie, Thierry, 2003. Law enforcement and transition. European Economic 
Review, 47, 669-68. 
Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. Government in transition. European Economic Review, 41, 385-410. 
Shleifer, Andrei, Treisman, Daniel, 2001. Without a map: political tactics and economic 
reform in Russia. MIT Press: Cambridge. 
Sonin, Konstantin, 2003. Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights. Journal 
of Comparative Economics, 31, 715–731. 
Stubbs, Tim, 2009. Overview of Russian bankruptcy law and practice: what can creditors 
expect in the current crisis? Presentation for the US-Russia Business Council. Available at 
https://www.usrbc.org/pics/File/Events/LegalConference2009/Tim%20Stubbs%20Bankruptc
y%20Law%20presentation_Eng_final.pdf 
Yasin, Yevgeny, Gimpelson, Vladimir, Golikova, Victoria, Gonchar, Ksenia., Dolgopyatova, 
Tatiana, Kuznetsov, Boris, Yakovlev, Andrei. 2010. Russian manufacturing revisited: 
industrial enterprises at the start of the 2008 financial crisis. Helsinki: 2010. BOFIT Online 
No. 5. 
Zhang, Xin, 2008. The end of “primitive accumulation”? Political economy of bankruptcy 
legislations in Russia. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National 
Conference, Chicago, Il. 
40 
 
Zhuravskaya, Elena, (2008) Is there the rule of law in Russia? The case of corporate raiding: 
a note. Economics Working Paper No.94, Centre for Research into Post-Communist 
Economies, UCL, London. 
Table 1 Perceived probability of threats to property rights by type, percent 
How probable is it that in the next 2 or 3 
years your firm... 
Very 
probable 
More or less 
probable 
Very 
improbable 
Total N 
will be included into a state-owned 
company 
8.9 36.5 54.6 100 866 
will be taken over by a larger and more 
powerful private company 
13.6 47.6 38.8 100 863 
will be subjected by raiders attacks 14.0 47.3 38.7 100 850 
will fall under control of local/regional 
authorities 
12.0 46.2 41.8 100 844 
will suffer from inter-corporate conflicts 
among major shareholders 
7.3 40.7 52.0 100 865 
 
Table 2 Distribution of the surveyed firms by the number of responses “very probable”, 
“more or less probable” and “very improbable” to the question on anticipated redistributive 
threats, percent 
Number of anticipated threats  Very probable  More or less probable Very improbable 
0 64.7 23.1 20.7 
1 23.3 15.9 20.2 
2 8.7 18.1 16.3 
3 2.1 16.5 14.5 
4 0.7 13.3 10.8 
5 0.5 13.2 17.5 
Average number of anticipated 
threats (out of possible five) by 
probability per company  0.52 2.21 2.27 
 
41 
 
Table 3 Correlation matrix of redistributive threats (Spearman’s rho) 
How probable is it that in the next 2 or 3 years 
your firm... 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. will be included into a state-owned company 1 0.323*** 0.241**** 0.320*** 0.263*** 
2. will be taken over by a larger and more 
powerful private company 
0.323*** 1 0.408** 0.372*** 0.325*** 
3. will be subjected by raiders attacks 0.241*** 0.408*** 1 0.416*** 0.374*** 
4. will fall under control of local/regional 
authorities 
0.320*** 0.372*** 0.416*** 1 0.340*** 
5. will be suffered from inter-corporate conflicts 
among major shareholders 
0.263*** 0.325*** 0.374*** 0.340*** 1 
Notes: include firms that gave estimates for all five positions; *** 0.01 (two tail).  
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Table 4 Redistributive threats as confronted by various categories of firms  
Categories Share of firms (%) perceiving as “very probable”  Average 
number of 
“very 
probable” 
threats per 
firm 
inclusion 
into a 
state-
owned 
company 
take-over by 
a larger  
private 
company 
raiders 
attacks 
falling under 
control of 
local/ 
regional 
authorities 
inter-
corporate 
conflicts 
among major 
shareholders 
Size (number of employees)        
Less than 100 4.2 17.9 18.1 12.3 9.0 0.62 
100 – 250 6.0 15.8 16.3 14.7 7.8 0.61 
251-500 7.1 12.0 12.5 11.7 8.3 0.52 
501 – 1000 10.5 11.6 12.8 7.9 7.7 0.51 
More than 1000 20.8 9.5 9.5 11.0 2.4 0.53 
Location       
Moscow 18.2 7.1 22.2 9.6 7.1 0.64 
Large city 10.6 9.8 13.6 10.2 5.9 0.50 
Small town  6.5 18.0 11.5 13.9 9.1 0.59 
Countryside 3.2 18.8 22.4 13.6 6.3 0.64 
Age       
Founded before 1992 10.4 14.2 14.4 12.4 7.9 0.59 
Founded in 1992 or later 4.5 11.8 13.0 10.6 5.5 0.45 
State ownership        
No 5.1 13.1 15.0 10.5 7.8 0.52 
Yes 40.8 22.2 11.5 21.1 7.2 1.03 
Foreign ownership        
No 7.1 14.8 16.0 11.4 7.6 0.57 
Yes 3.9 8.1 6.9 7.8 8.2 0.35 
Insider (managerial) ownership        
No 6.2 11.8 17.4 11.4 7.8 0.55 
Yes 8.0 15.2 8.9 11.4 6.1 0.50 
43 
 
Degree of market competition         
Low  8.1 9.6 12.0 10.2 4.1 0.44 
High 9.1 14.7 14.5 12.5 8.2 0.59 
Sales for export        
No 9.4 15.9 13.7 16.4 7.3 0.63 
Yes 8.5 11.7 14.3 8.5 6.6 0.49 
Financial condition       
Poor 7.2 26.2 17.4 13.0 8.8 0.73 
Satisfactory 10.3 12.1 13.4 13.7 7.0 0.57 
Good 6.0 8.1 13.1 6.4 7.0 0.41 
Subsidies from the federal budget       
No 8.1 13.8 14.3 11.8 7.4 0.55 
Yes 15.6 12.0 12.0 12.1 6.7 0.58 
Subsidies from the local/regional 
budgets       
No 8.4 13.5 13.3 10.1 7.0 0.52 
Yes 11.2 13.7 17.2 20.0 8.6 0.71 
Financing social projects run by 
regional or local authorities       
No 8.2 12.7 6.8 7.3 4.0 0.39 
Yes 9.1 13.8 16.1 13.4 8.3 0.61 
Recent litigation experience       
No 7.1 10.4 10.3 12.6 6.5 0.47 
Yes 9.5 14.6 15.2 11.8 7.6 0.59 
Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with other firms       
No 10.0 11.8 12.1 13.2 6.9 0.54 
Yes 5.5 16.4 17.3 8.3 8.8 0.56 
Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with state       
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No 8.2 11.2 7.9 11.6 5.7 0.45 
Yes 8.9 15.1 19.9 12.8 9.4 0.66 
Engagement in tax evasion       
No 10.1 13.0 12.9 10.9 5.8 0.53 
Yes 7.6 14.2 15.2 13.1 8.8 0.59 
Corruption as obstacle        
Not important 8.9 10.9 9.0 10.1 5.7 0.45 
Important 8.8 17.5 21.3 14.7 9.7 0.72 
Lack of safety as obstacle       
Not important 8.8 11.3 10.0 10.5 5.8 0.46 
Important 9.2 23.5 31.1 18.2 13.4 0.95 
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Table 5 Probit regressions for specific redistributive threats (marginal effects) 
 Inclusion into 
a state-
owned 
company 
Take-over by 
a larger 
private 
company 
Raiders 
attacks 
Falling under 
control of 
local/ 
regional 
authorities 
Inter-
corporate 
conflicts 
among major 
share-holders 
State ownership (yes = 1) 0.19 0.21 -0.04 0.16 -0.02 
(5.09)*** (3.25)*** (0.85) (2.82)** (0.87) 
Foreign ownership (yes = 1) -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 
(0.75) (0.92) (1.30) (0.34) (0.47) 
Insider (managerial) ownership (yes = 1) 0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01 
(1.76)* (0.98) (2.55)** (1.12) (0.45) 
Financial condition (poor = 1) -0.00 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.01 
(0.30) (3.01)*** (1.39) (0.92) (0.35) 
Ln number of employees 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
(3.41)*** (1.18) (2.45)** (0.94) (2.34)** 
Market competition (high = 1) 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.69) (2.28)** (0.39) (0.81) (0.77) 
Sales for export (yes = 1) -0.06 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.03 
(4.21)*** (1.95)* (0.43) (1.95)* (1.41) 
Financial aid from the federal authorities 
(yes = 1) 
0.03 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 
(1.51) (0.00) (0.30) (0.65) (0.18) 
Financial aid from regional or local 
authorities (yes = 1) 
-0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.07 0.01 
(0.43) (0.88) (0.86) (1.93)** (0.70) 
Financing social projects run by regional 
or local authorities (yes = 1) 
-0.01 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.05 
(0.54) (0.49) (2.83)*** (1.29) (2.55)** 
Recent litigation experience (yes = 1) 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 
(1.85)** (1.21) (1.40) (0.92) (0.26) 
Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with other firms (no = 1) 
-0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 
(2.04)** 0.95) (1.00) (2.78)*** (0.43) 
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Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with state (no = 1) 
0.01 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.01 
(0.97) (0.36) (3.77)*** (0.07) (0.83) 
Engagement in tax evasion (yes = 1) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 
(0.62) (0.55) (0.96) (0.98) (3.11)*** 
Corruption as obstacle (important = 1) -0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.01 
(0.04) (0.72) (1.74)* (1.66)* (0.30) 
Lack of safety as obstacle (important = 1) 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.04 
(1.84)* (1.79)* (4.14)*** (2.06)** (2.01)** 
Age (founded in 1992 or later = 1) -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
(0.99) (0.26) (0.47) (0.22) (0.02) 
Location (countryside = 1) -0.01 0.08 0.13 0.02 -0.01 
(0.29) (1.35) (2.36)** (0.49) (0.33) 
Regions included included included included included 
Industries included included included included included 
Observations 628 617 628 607 630 
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.13 0.22 0.14 0.16 
Notes: * significant at 0.1 ** significant at 0.05 *** significant at 0.01. Robust z-statistics in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6 Regression estimates for the integral indices of the insecurity of property rights (marginal 
effects) 
 OLS (additive index) Negative binomial 
regression (additive 
index) 
Probit (binary index) 
State ownership (yes = 1) 0.54 0.44 0.38 
(3.48)*** (2.86)*** (4.09)*** 
Foreign ownership (yes = 1) -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 
(0.87) (0.69) (0.45) 
Insider (managerial) ownership (yes 
= 1) 
0.10 0.08 0.03 
(1.53) (1.62) (0.75) 
Financial condition (poor = 1) 0.19 0.13 0.11 
(1.80)* (1.81)* (1.89)* 
Ln number of employees -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 
(1.81)* (2.00)** (1.86)* 
Market competition (high = 1) 0.16 0.16 0.11 
(2.21)** (2.73)*** (2.15)** 
Sales for export (yes = 1) -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 
(1.20) (1.36) (1.51) 
Financial aid from the federal 
authorities (yes = 1) 
0.02 0.01 -0.07 
(0.20) (0.10) (0.28) 
Financial aid from regional or local 
authorities (yes = 1) 
0.05 0.07 0.11 
(0.55) (0.92) (1.66)* 
Financing social projects run by 
regional or local authorities (yes = 1) 
0.17 0.14 0.12 
(2.02)** (2.09)** (2.19)** 
Recent litigation experience (yes = 1) 0.15 0.12 0.15 
(1.83)* (1.95)** (3.05)*** 
Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with other firms (no = 1) 
-0.10 -0.07 -0.07 
(1.22) (1.36) (1.45) 
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Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with state (no = 1) 
0.12 0.09 0.09 
(1.66)* (1.72)* (1.92)* 
Engagement in tax evasion (yes = 1) 0.14 0.11 0.04 
(1.95)** (2.05)** (0.91) 
Corruption as obstacle (important = 
1) 
0.16 0.11 0.06 
(2.07)** (1.88)* (1.34) 
Lack of safety as obstacle (important 
= 1) 
0.37 0.26 0.22 
(3.48)*** (3.02)*** (4.07)*** 
Age (founded in 1992 or later = 1) -0.04 -0.04 0.02 
(0.62) (0.75) (0.50) 
Location (countryside = 1) 0.22 0.20 0.21 
(1.72)* (1.73)* (2.41)** 
Regions included included included 
Industries included included included 
N of observations 581 581 642 
Adj. R2 or Pseudo R2 0.19 0.14 0.15 
Notes: * significant at 0.1 ** significant at 0.05 *** significant at 0.01. Robust t-statistics or z-
statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 7 Probit regressions for the characteristics of firms’ investment and innovation 
behavior (specifications with specific redistributive risks, marginal effects)*  
Regressions Large 
investments  
Innovations  Provision of 
customer 
credit  
Investment 
projects for 
the next year 
Use of long-
term strategic 
planning  
Inclusion into a state-owned 
company 
-0.10 -0.04 -0.22 -0.15 -0.01 
(1.47) (0.56) (2.54)** (1.84)* (0.12) 
N of observations 
633 634 625 608 534 
Pseudo R2 
0.13 0.25 0.15 0.12 0.26 
 
     
Take-over by a larger private 
company 
-0.08 -0.12 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 
(1.44) (2.17)* (0.69) (0.84) (1.81)* 
N of observations 
622 623 617 598 526 
Pseudo R2 
0.12 0.25 0.15 0.12 0.25 
      
Raiders attacks -0.09 0.05 -0.09 -0.07 0.01 
(1.61) (0.80) (1.50) (1.19) (0.23) 
N of observations 
633 634 625 608 534 
Pseudo R2 
0.12 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.25 
 
     
Falling under control of local/ 
regional authorities 
-0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -0.12 -0.07 
(1.71)* (1.46) (0.92) (1.76)* (1.12) 
N of observations 
612 613 606 586 517 
Pseudo R2 
0.13 0.25 0.15 0.13 0.26 
 
     
Inter-corporate conflicts among 
major share-holders 
-0.07 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 
(1.07) (2.19)* (1.88)* (2.17)* (2.41)* 
N of observations 
641 642 633 615 541 
Pseudo R2 
0.12 0.24 0.15 0.13 0.26 
* In addition to variables for specific redistributive threats all regressions include the 
following set of controls: state ownership; foreign ownership; insider (managerial) 
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ownership; ln number of employees; financial condition; market competition; sales for export; 
financial aid from the federal authorities; financial aid from regional or local authorities; financing 
social projects run by regional or local authorities; recent litigation experience; confidence in judicial 
protection in disputes with other firms; confidence in judicial protection in disputes with state; 
engagement in tax evasion; corruption; lack of safety; age; type of location; dummies for regions; 
dummies for sectors. 
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Table 8 Probit regressions for the characteristics of firms’ investment and innovation 
behavior (specification with the additive index of the insecurity of property rights, marginal 
effects)  
Variable Large 
investments  
Innovations  Provision of 
customer 
credit  
Investment 
projects for 
the next year 
Use of long-
term 
strategic 
planning  
Integral index of the insecurity of 
property rights (additive) 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 
(2.41)** (2.39) ** (1.35) (1.96)* (2.15)** 
State ownership (yes = 1) -0.06 -0.07 -0.24 0.03 -0.07 
(0.64) (0.91) (2.72)*** (0.40) (0.90) 
Foreign ownership (yes = 1) 0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.03 
(0.64) (0.82) (1.50) (0.26) (0.47) 
Insider (managerial) ownership (yes = 
1) 
-0.02 0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 
(0.51) (2.59)** (0.41) (0.18) (1.36)  
Financial condition (poor = 1) -0.10 0.05 0.02 -0.11 0.05 
(1.99)** (0.94) (0.45) (1.86) * (0.88) 
Ln number of employees 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.09 
(3.63)*** (4.59)*** (2.25) ** (1.61) (3.75)*** 
Market competition (high = 1) -0.03 0.09 0.20 -0.06 0.10 
(0.64) (1.78)* (3.75)*** (1.02) (1.98)** 
Sales for export (yes = 1) 0.01 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.19 
(0.26) (4.08)*** (0.71) (0.39) (3.64)*** 
Financial aid from the federal 
authorities (yes = 1) 
0.05 0.17 0.05 0.23 0.13 
(0.72) (2.14)** (0.69) (2.70)*** (1.63) 
Financial aid from regional or local 
authorities (yes = 1) 
0.18 -0.02 0.07 -0.08 0.00 
(3.11)*** (0.35) (1.27) (1.15) (0.02) 
Financing social projects run by 
regional or local authorities (yes = 1) 
0.10 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06 
(1.92)** (1.05) (0.49) (0.90) (1.02) 
Recent litigation experience (yes = 1) 0.12 -0.02 0.05 0.16 0.01 
(2.44)** (0.43) (0.99) (2.95)*** (0.17) 
Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with other firms (no = 1) 
0.03 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.06 
(0.63) (1.12) (2.45)** (0.96) (1.00) 
Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with state (no = 1) 
0.01 -0.10 0.10 -0.03 -0.11 
(0.09) (2.18)** (2.28)** (0.60) (2.29)** 
Engagement in tax evasion (yes = 1) 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.01 
(1.07) (1.01) (0.20) (1.89)* (017) 
Corruption as obstacle (important = 1) 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.07 
(1.35) (1.34) (0.80) (1.11) (1.50) 
Lack of safety as obstacle (important 
= 1) 
0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.08 0.04 
(0.26) (0.87) (1.09) (1.44) (0.72) 
Age (founded in 1992 or later = 1) 0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
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(1.68)* (0.58) (0.01) (0.14) (0.21) 
Location (countryside = 1) -0.12 -0.19 0.08 0.03 -0.20 
(1.65)* (2.11)** (1.24) (0.36) (2.27)** 
Regions included included included included included 
Industries included included included included included 
N of observations 573 574 569 554 488 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.28 0.16 0.13 0.28 
Notes: * significant at 0.1 ** significant at 0.05 *** significant at 0.01. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 9 Probit regressions for the characteristics of firms' investment and innovation behavior 
(marginal effects, specification with the binary index of the insecurity of property rights)  
Variable Large 
investments  
Innovations  Provision of 
customer 
credit  
Investment 
projects for 
the next year 
Use of long-
term 
strategic 
planning 
Integral index of the insecurity of 
property rights (binary) 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 
(1.99)** (1.93)* (2.59)** (2.00) ** (1.99)** 
State ownership (yes = 1) -0.04 -0.11 -0.23 0.07 -0.11 
(0.49) (1.46) (2.76)** (0.76) (1.47) 
Foreign ownership (yes = 1) 0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.00 -0.02 
(0.64) (0.46) (0.90) (0.05) (0.24) 
Insider (managerial) ownership (yes = 
1) 
-0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
(0.29) (1.95)** (0.13) (0.26) (0.73) 
Financial condition (poor = 1) -0.11 -0.00 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 
(2.25) ** (0.05) (0.15) (1.95)* (0.13) 
Ln number of employees 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.09 
(3.71)*** (4.90)*** (2.28)** (1.75)* (4.06)*** 
Market competition (high = 1) -0.04 0.05 0.18 -0.07 0.04 
(0.79) (1.09) (3.56)*** (1.29) (0.81) 
Sales for export (yes = 1) -0.01 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.16 
(0.12) (3.58)*** (1.30) (0.38) (3.15)*** 
Financial aid from the federal 
authorities (yes = 1) 
0.02 0.13 0.08 0.19 0.08 
(0.26) (1.67)* (1.02) (2.40)** (1.02) 
Financial aid from regional or local 
authorities (yes = 1) 
0.21 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.02 
(3.70)*** (0.33) (0.52) (0.88) (0.37) 
Financing social projects run by 
regional or local authorities (yes = 1) 
0.08 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.07 
(1.65)* (1.27) (0.81) (0.93) (1.25) 
Recent litigation experience (yes = 1) 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.15 0.04 
(2.90) *** (0.11) (1.29) (2.85)*** (0.65) 
Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with other firms (no = 1) 
-0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.01 0.03 
(0.13) (0.68) (2.06)** (0.10) (0.51) 
Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with state (no = 1) 
0.04 -0.05 0.09 0.00 -0.06 
(0.79) (1.19) (2.23)** (0.03) (1.20) 
Engagement in tax evasion (yes = 1) 0.05 0.03 -0.00 0.11 -0.01 
(1.26) (0.66) (0.02) (2.43)** (0.20) 
Corruption as obstacle (important = 1) 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.06 
(1.53) (1.02) (0.21) (1.26) (1.25) 
Lack of safety as obstacle (important 
= 1) 
-0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.10 0.06 
(0.55) (1.09) (0.62) (1.80)* (1.10) 
Age (founded in 1992 or later = 1) 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
(0.92) (0.18) (0.14) (0.02) (0.05) 
Location (countryside = 1) -0.13 -0.22 0.12 0.09 -0.23 
(1.84) * (2.54)** (1.82)* (1.05) (2. 78)*** 
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Regions included included included included included 
Industries included included included included included 
N of observations 641 642 633 615 541 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.26 
Notes: * significant at 0.1 ** significant at 0.05 *** significant at 0.01. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. 
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APENDIX 
 
Table A1. General characteristics of the HSE-Levada sample  
 Average Median 
% of surveyed 
firms 
Industry    
food 
- - 
24.6 
textiles 
- - 
9.3 
wood processing 
- - 
8.5 
chemicals 
- - 
9.2 
Metallurgy 
- - 
10.2 
electrical equipment 
- - 
12.2 
Vehicles 
- - 
9.0 
Machinery 
- - 
17.0 
Firm size (number of employees) 
574 293 - 
less than 100 
- - 14.0 
100 – 250 
- - 31.0 
251-500 
- - 24.2 
501 – 1000 
- - 16.5 
more than 1000 
- - 14.3 
Location 
   
Moscow 
- - 6.3 
urban areas 
  86.0 
Countryside 
- - 7.7 
New firm (founded in 1992 or later) 
- - 24.8 
State's stake in ownership  
- - 11.3 
Foreign shareholder present 
- - 10.8 
Managers’ stake in ownership 
- - 58.6 
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Exporter 
- - 46.1 
Market competition  
   
low  
- - 22.4 
High 
- - 77.6 
Financial condition 
   
Poor 
- - 15.9 
Satisfactory 
- - 63.2 
Good 
- - 20.9 
Subsidising from the federal budget 
0.10 0 
- 
Subsidising from the local/regional budgets 
0.17 0 
- 
Financing social projects run by regional or local 
authorities 
0.77 
1 
- 
Recent litigation experience 0.74 
1 
- 
Lack of confidence in judicial protection in disputes 
with other firms 
0.26 
0 
- 
Lack of confidence in judicial protection in disputes 
with state 
0.52 
1 
- 
Engagement in tax evasion 0.49 
0 
- 
Corruption as obstacle 0.40 
0 
- 
Lack of safety as obstacle 0.19 
0 
- 
Investment in 2008 
0.24 0 - 
Recent innovations 
0.29 0 - 
Provision of customer credit 
0.71 1 - 
Investment projects for the next year 
0.33 0 - 
Long-term strategic planning 
0.28 0 - 
Sales per worker in 2008, .000 rubles 
1,122 671 - 
Average monthly wage, rubles 
13,572 12,000 - 
N - - 957 
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Table A2. Description and construction of the institutional variables 
No Question Scale Variable 
36f. How serious an obstacle for operation and 
growth of your business is CORRUPTION? 
1-5 (1 – not an 
obstacle, 5 – very 
serious obstacle), 
recoded as binary 
Corruption (equals 0 if initial 
values were 1 or 2 and equals 1 
if these values were 3, 4 or 5) 
36g. How serious an obstacle for operation and 
growth of your business is LACK OF PERSONAL 
SAFETY (theft, racket, terrorism etc)? 
1-5 (1 – not an 
obstacle, 5 – very 
serious obstacle), 
recoded as binary 
Lack of personal safety (equals 0 
if initial values were 1 or 2 and 
equals 1 if these values were 3, 
4 or 5) 
37a. To what extent do you agree with the 
statement that in the case of  disputes with 
OTHER FIRMS courts would be able to protect 
your legal interests in the sphere of property 
rights and contract enforcement? 
1-4 (1 – fully agree, 4 – 
fully disagree), recoded 
as binary 
Confidence in judicial protection 
in disputes with other firms 
(equals 0 if initial values were 1 
or 2 and equals 1 if they were 3 
or 4) 
37b. To what extent do you agree with the 
statement that in the case of disputes with THE 
STATE courts would be able to protect your 
legal interests in the sphere of property rights 
and contract enforcement? 
1-4 (1 – fully agree, 4 – 
fully disagree), recoded 
as binary 
Confidence in judicial protection 
in disputes with state (equals 0 
if initial values were 1 or 2 and 
equals 1 if they were 3 or 4) 
38. Did your firm participate in litigations as 
DEFENDANT OR PLAINTIFF during 2005-08? 
1 – yes, 0 – no  Recent litigation experience 
40. Many firms are not in a position to pay taxes 
fully and for this reason underreport their 
proceeds. In your opinion, on average how big 
is this UNDERREPORTING OF PROCEEDS IN 
YOUR INDUSTRY (as a percentage of the actual 
proceeds, approximate estimate)? 
Percent, recoded as 
binary  
Engagement in tax evasion 
(equals 1 if at least one of 
responses to questions 40 and 
41 was positive and equals 0 if 
responses to were “zero 
percent”) 
41. Many firms are not in a position to pay tax on 
profit in full and for this reason over-report 
their costs. In your opinion, on average how big 
is this OVERREPORTING OF COSTS IN YOUR 
INDUSTRY (as a percentage of the actual costs, 
approximate estimate)? 
Percent, recoded as 
binary 
46. Did your firm provide SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL 
PROJECTS run by the local or regional 
authorities during 2007-08 (financing social 
infrastructure or housing, sponsoring 
regional/municipal programs etc)? 
1 – yes, 0 – no Financing social projects run by 
regional or local authorities 
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Table A3. Comparative characteristics of the sub-samples of firms included in or excluded from the 
analysis 
Variables Sub-sample of firms 
included in analysis 
Sub-sample of firms 
excluded from analysis 
Additive index of insecurity of property rights, 
average 
0.51 0.54 
Binary index of insecurity of property rights, 
average 
0.34 0.37 
Share of firms with state’s stake in ownership, % 8 14 
Share of firms with foreign shareholders, % 11 10 
Share of firms with managers’ stake in ownership, 
% 
50 40 
Ln number of employees, average 5.74 5.51 
Share of firms in poor financial condition, % 18 12 
Share of firms facing intense market competition, % 79 74 
Share of exporters, % 57 48 
Share of firms receiving subsidies from the federal 
budget 
10 10 
Share of firms receiving subsidies from 
local/regional budgets 
17 16 
Share of firms financing social projects run by 
regional or local authorities, % 
79 73 
Share of firms with recent litigation experience, % 78 65 
Share of firms non-confident in judicial protection 
in disputes with other firms, % 
28 21 
Share of firms non-confident in judicial protection 
in disputes with state, % 
51 53 
Share of firms supposedly engaged in tax evasion, 
% 
47 54 
Share of firms considering corruption as obstacle, % 42 34 
Share of firms considering lack of safety as 
obstacle, % 
20 18 
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Share of new firms (founded in 1992 or later), % 26 21 
Share of firms located in the countryside, % 7 9 
Food, % 25 24 
Textile, % 9 10 
Wood processing, % 9 8 
Chemicals, % 9 10 
Metallurgy, % 11 8 
Electrical equipment, % 11 15 
Vehicles, % 9 8 
Machinery, % 17 17 
Share of firms located in Moscow, % 6 7 
Share of firms located in the countryside, % 7 9 
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Table А4. Heckman estimates for the additive index of the insecurity of property rights  
 Main equation Selection equation 
State ownership (yes = 1) 0.54 0.11 
(4.18)*** (0.39) 
Foreign ownership (yes = 1) -0.08 0.12 
(0.76) (0.51) 
Insider (managerial) ownership (yes = 1) 0.9 0.27 
(1.45) (1.92)* 
Financial condition (poor = 1) 0.19 0.14 
(2.24)** (0.72) 
Ln number of employees -0.07 0.05 
(2.09)* (0.57) 
Market competition (high = 1) 0.16 0.12 
(1.99)* (0.73) 
Sales for export (yes = 1) -0.09 0.08 
(1.20) (0.46) 
Financial aid from the federal authorities 
(yes = 1) 
0.01 -0.06 
(0.11) (0.37) 
Financial aid from regional or local 
authorities (yes = 1) 
0.05 -0.14 
(0.58) (0.70) 
Financing social projects run by regional 
or local authorities (yes = 1) 
0.17 0.16 
(2.09)* (0.83) 
Recent litigation experience (yes = 1) 0.14 0.14 
(1.80)* (0.85) 
Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with other firms (no = 1) 
-0.10 -0.06 
(1.32) (0.37) 
Confidence in judicial protection in 
disputes with state (no = 1) 
0.12 -0.16 
(1.70)* (1.05) 
Engagement in tax evasion (yes = 1) 0.14 -0.20 
(2.13)* (1.36) 
Corruption as obstacle (important = 1) 0.15 0.33 
(2.10)** (2.20) * 
Lack of safety as obstacle (important = 1) 0.38 -0.19 
(4.44)*** (1.48) 
Age (founded in 1992 or later = 1) -0.05 0.33 
(0.64) (2.02)* 
Location (countryside = 1) 0.22 -0.04 
(1.73)* (0.15) 
Regions included Included 
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Industry included Included 
Constant 0.19 0.74 
(1.22) (2.38)** 
N of observations 582 664 
athrho -0.09 
(0.16) 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =     0.24  Prob > 0.627 
 
 
